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O
n September 1, 2006, the 
World Health Organisation 
(WHO) announced that a 
deadly new strain of extensively drug-
resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) had 
been detected in Tugela Ferry (Figure 
1), a rural town in the South African 
province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) [1], 
the epicentre of South Africa’s HIV/
AIDS epidemic. Of the 544 patients 
studied in the area in 2005, 221 had 
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis 
(MDR-TB), that is, Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis that is resistant to at least 
rifampicin and isoniazid. Of these 221 
cases, 53 were identiﬁ  ed as XDR-TB 
(see Table 1 and [2]), i.e., MDR-TB 
plus resistance to at least three of the 
six classes of second-line agents [3]. 
This reportedly represents almost 
one-sixth of all known XDR-TB cases 
reported worldwide [4]. Of the 53, 44 
were tested for HIV and all were HIV 
infected. 
The median survival from the time of 
sputum specimen collection was 16 days 
for 52 of the 53 infected individuals, 
including six health workers and 
those reportedly taking antiretrovirals 
[2]. Such a fatality rate for XDR-TB, 
especially within such a relatively short 
period of time, is unprecedented 
anywhere in the world. 
The Threat to Regional 
and Global Health
South Africa is one of the world’s 
fastest growing tourist destinations [5], 
home to millions of migrant labourers 
from neighbouring countries, and its 
ports and roads service several other 
African countries. Seroprevalence 
rates for HIV in South Africa, and in 
adjoining nations such as Lesotho and 
Swaziland, are very high. Cumulatively, 
these factors make for a potentially 
explosive international health crisis. 
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Figure 1. Map of South Africa Showing Tugela Ferry in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, the 
Epicentre of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Epidemic
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The threat to regional and global 
public health is thus clear [6], and 
further underlined by reports that 
XDR-TB is now considered endemic 
to KZN [7], as it has been reported in 
at least 39 hospitals throughout the 
province [8] and in other parts of the 
country [9–11]. At least 30 new cases of 
XDR-TB are reportedly detected each 
month in KZN alone [12]. 
The True Extent of the Problem
Diagnosed cases of XDR-TB likely 
represent a small proportion of the 
true extent of the problem. The 
number of persons harbouring latent 
infections is unknown (and likely 
unknowable at present). Ofﬁ  cial 
statistics also likely underestimate 
the true prevalence of XDR-TB, as 
the current national TB guidelines 
prescribe the conditions under which 
M. tuberculosis susceptibility testing 
should be done [13]. These guidelines 
recommend susceptibility testing for 
those patients who have previously 
been treated for TB or fail to respond 
to treatment after two months of TB 
treatment, at which point there is 
a high treatment interruption rate. 
In addition, specialised laboratory 
facilities are required for such 
testing. Routine sputum culture and 
susceptibility testing of all patients 
suspected as having TB should form 
part of a multi-faceted approach to 
identifying and addressing TB drug 
resistance. 
In recognition of the global threat 
posed by these factors, on September 
9, 2006, WHO urged a response to the 
outbreak akin to recent global efforts 
to control severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and bird ﬂ  u [14]. 
The South African government’s initial 
lethargic reaction to the crisis [15,16] 
and uncertainty amongst South African 
health professionals concerning the 
ethical, social, and human rights 
implications of effectively tackling 
this outbreak [17,18] highlight the 
urgent need to address these issues lest 
doubt and inaction spawn a full-blown 
XDR-TB epidemic in South Africa and 
beyond. 
Factors Fuelling the Outbreak
Several well-documented factors, 
including high treatment interruption 
rates of drug-sensitive TB and 
consequent low cure rates, together 
with the HIV epidemic, have 
contributed to the emergence of 
MDR-TB and XDR-TB in South 
Africa and merit urgent remediation. 
For instance, the development of 
drug resistance may result from 
inappropriate treatment regimens 
(e.g., choice of drugs, dosage, 
duration of treatment), programme 
factors (e.g., irregular drug supply, 
incompetent health personnel), and 
patient factors (e.g., poor adherence, 
mal-absorption). In fact, it could be 
said that the emergence of MDR-TB 
itself is evidence of the systematic 
failure of the global community to 
tackle a curable disease. 
The factors that facilitate the spread 
of tuberculosis are well known and 
abundantly present in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Alongside inadequate health-
care system response, poverty and 
global inequity contribute to the 
worsening of the global TB situation 
[19,20]. According to South Africa’s 
Medical Research Council, about half 
of adults in South Africa with active 
TB are cured each year, compared 
with 80% in countries with better 
resources. Moreover, nationally, about 
15% of patients default on the ﬁ  rst-line 
six-month treatment, while almost a 
third of patients default on second-
line treatment [21]. This highlights 
the urgent need for the health system 
(which includes health-care workers) 
to reinforce the DOTS (directly 
observed treatment, short-course) 
and DOTS-plus strategy, to revise 
current adherence counselling and 
public information strategies, and to 
actively promote avoidance of a “victim 
blaming approach”. The emergence of 
MDR-TB and XDR-TB is an indicator 
of the poor implementation of South 
Africa’s TB Control Programme.
A neglected but signiﬁ  cant factor 
fuelling the MDR-TB and XDR-
TB outbreaks in South Africa [22] 
is the lack of infection control in 
institutions, including the lack of 
simple administrative measures such 
as triaging of patients, as well as more 
sophisticated expensive environmental 
control measures, such as negative 
pressure rooms and personal 
respiratory protection (respirators). 
Infection control must be addressed 
in order to reduce the nosocomial 
transmission of these infections. 
In the modern era, tuberculosis 
is recognised as a disease that preys 
upon social disadvantage [23,24]. 
Thus, the inadvertent deterrent impact 
that health and social welfare policies 
are having on the hospitalisation of 
such patients needs to be explored. 
Currently, 10 million South Africans—
almost one in four citizens—are 
beneﬁ  ciaries of some form of social 
welfare [25]. With unemployment in 
South Africa conservatively estimated 
at about 27% of the population [26], 
social welfare grants often constitute 
the sole or primary income of many 
households. While South Africa does 
not have a formal universal health-care 
system, those who require but who 
cannot afford to pay for hospitalisation 
are often treated free of charge in the 
public sector [27]. However, current 
government policy stipulates that those 
who are hospitalised at state expense 
lose their social welfare beneﬁ  ts for the 
duration of their hospitalisation. 
Faced with the prospect of being 
deprived of their gainful employment 
Table 1. Characteristics of Patients in South Africa With XDR-TB
Characteristic No. (%)
Tuberculosis (TB) characteristics (n = 53):
Pulmonary TB alone 40 (75%)
Pulmonary and extrapulmonary TB 13 (25%)
Sputum-smear positive 42 (79%)
Sputum-smear negative 11 (21%)
Previous TB treatment (n = 47):
No previous treatment 26 (55%)
Previous treatment: cure or completed treatment 14 (30%)
Treatment default or failure 7 (15%)
Previous admission in past 2 y (n = 42)
Admission for any cause 28 (67%)
No previous admission 14 (33%)
Data from Gandhi NR, Moll A, Sturm AW, Pawinski R, Govender T, et al. (2006) Extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis as a 
cause of death in patients co-infected with tuberculosis and HIV in a rural area of South Africa. Lancet  368: 1575–1580.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040050.t001
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and/or having their welfare beneﬁ  ts 
suspended for the duration of 
hospitalisation—which in the case of 
MDR-TB or XDR-TB could last 18–24 
months—many MDR-TB patients opt 
not to stay in hospitals, where their 
treatment adherence and resistance 
proﬁ  le could be closely monitored 
by health personnel. Instead, 
understandably, these highly infectious 
individuals fail to receive appropriate 
therapy and are likely to default on 
adherence. They mix broadly in society 
among non-infected individuals, 
typically utilise public transport, 
and seek or continue their gainful 
employment. In so doing, they pose a 
signiﬁ  cant public health risk to their 
families, co-workers, local community, 
and the wider public they encounter. 
Given the cost of trying to manage 
a MDR-TB or XDR-TB epidemic [28], 
the South African government ought 
to rethink its policy of suspending 
welfare beneﬁ  ts to patients with MDR-
TB or XDR-TB for the duration of 
their hospitalisation. Moreover, it 
ought to consider extending welfare 
beneﬁ  ts to those infected patients who 
are gainfully employed as an incentive 
to draw such patients into the health 
system so that their adherence to 
anti-TB medication and resistance 
proﬁ  le can be monitored. Although 
these measures will undoubtedly have 
cost implications for the government 
and may not adequately compensate 
patients for their lost income, they 
would at least serve as some form of 
incentive and encouragement for 
infected individuals to enter and 
remain in the health system, although 
admittedly, their conﬁ  nement could 
conceivably be indeﬁ  nite or until they 
die. It would also be a partial realisation 
of the reciprocity principle, which we 
explore below.
Factors that Could Undermine 
Efforts to Tackle the Outbreak
Several factors threaten to stymie 
efforts to control the XDR-TB outbreak 
in South Africa. Drug resistance can 
only be detected if a patient presents 
to the health system, a health-care 
worker suspects TB, an appropriate 
specimen is taken, facilities exist for 
smear and cultures, and if laboratories 
are equipped to do drug susceptibility 
testing. Moreover, because most 
hospital beds in South Africa are 
occupied by patients infected with 
opportunistic infections associated 
with HIV/AIDS, there is little or no 
spare capacity to accommodate patients 
with MDR-TB and XDR-TB. However, 
given the airborne transmission of TB 
and the grave threat that MDR-TB and 
XDR-TB pose immediately to such 
immunocompromised patients and, if 
the spread of XDR-TB is not abated, 
to global health, the government 
ought to reconsider its prioritisation 
of hospital resources. It seems that, 
at minimum, patients with XDR-TB 
requiring inpatient care should be 
housed in facilities independent both 
of patients with MDR-TB and patients 
who are immunocompromised. The 
containment of infectious patients with 
XDR-TB may arguably take precedence 
over any other patients not infected 
with highly infectious and deadly 
airborne diseases, including those 
with full-blown AIDS. This is an issue 
requiring urgent attention from the 
global community.
Is There a Role for Involuntary 
Detention?
The successful containment of TB, 
MDR-TB, and XDR-TB in South 
Africa and elsewhere carries human 
rights [29] and ethical implications. 
An important question that we must 
come to terms with is the extent to 
which judicially sanctioned restrictive 
measures should be employed to bring 
about control of what could develop 
into a lethal global pandemic. 
As diagnosis of MDR-TB and XDR-
TB can take several weeks, questions 
remain about what to do with patients 
suspected of being infected with 
MDR-TB or XDR-TB while awaiting 
susceptibility results. And once patients 
have been determined to be infected, 
there are questions about how long 
and how closely their clinical status 
should be monitored and under what 
conditions. Ideally, patients suspected 
of having TB should be isolated in 
an acute infectious diseases setting 
while awaiting anti-tuberculosis 
drug-susceptibility testing, and then 
triaged for further management 
based on these results. Current WHO 
guidelines recognise that this strategy 
is not feasible in resource-constrained 
environments. WHO recommends 
that persons with MDR-TB voluntarily 
refrain from mixing with the general 
public and from those susceptible to 
infection, while they are infectious and 
in ambulatory care [30]. The document 
is silent on what steps to take should 
such voluntary measures fail. 
The emergence of XDR-TB indicates 
that the WHO strategy of allowing 
the patient to assume responsibility 
for mixing with the general public 
may be too permissive and more 
attention to strategies of infection 
control in the community is required. 
In general, from both an ethical and 
legal perspective, measures that rely on 
voluntary cooperation and are the least 
restrictive in terms of interfering with 
human rights are preferred. However, 
if such measures prove to be ineffective, 
then more restrictive measures may 
need to be contemplated. Such 
measures should be taken with due 
consideration for the possibility that 
they may increase disincentives to seek 
care. However, if due care is taken to 
provide for the rights and needs of 
those so detained and therapeutic goals 
are kept paramount, such measures 
could play an important role in 
containing XDR-TB before it spreads 
more generally in the population 
globally.
The use of involuntary detention 
may legitimately be countenanced as a 
means to assure isolation and prevent 
infected individuals possibly spreading 
infection to others. However, South 
African ofﬁ  cials have raised human 
rights concerns in dealing with the 
country’s XDR-TB and MDR-TB 
outbreaks [18], although they have 
conceded that forcible treatment may be 
a viable option in tackling the outbreak 
[31]. Health workers and human rights 
advocates in South Africa and elsewhere 
must be reminded that although a 
country’s Bill of Rights may bestow a 
range of human rights on individuals, 
these rights can usually be restricted if 
doing so is reasonable and justiﬁ  able. 
They should be made aware of any 
national laws and municipal by-laws 
that permit the provision of involuntary 
treatment and isolation measures in the 
interests of public health. 
Moreover, the judiciary often 
has the authority to issue orders 
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compelling involuntary conﬁ  nement/
hospitalisation and treatment, even 
against the wishes of an affected 
party, if doing so is in the public 
interest. This option should only be 
invoked if non-coercive measures 
have failed. Such an approach has 
been endorsed by the European 
Court on Human Rights (ECHR) in 
Enhorn v. Sweden [32]. The applicant 
in this case was an HIV-infected 
man who had infected another party 
and disobeyed the instructions of 
public health ofﬁ  cials to desist from 
irresponsible and risky behaviour. 
The man complained to the ECHR 
that the compulsory isolation orders 
and his involuntary detention in a 
hospital had been in breach of Article 
5(1) of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. This 
article states that “Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of the 
person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases 
and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law”. Section 5(1)(e) 
provides for the situation at hand: 
“the lawful detention of persons for 
the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases”.
The applicant argued that the 
substantive provisions of Article 5 
were not made out in his case, given 
that the detention did not constitute 
a proportionate response to the need 
to prevent the spread of infectious 
disease. The court held that any such 
detention must be in compliance with 
both the principle of proportionality 
and the requirement that there be an 
“absence of arbitrariness” such that 
other less severe measures have been 
considered and found to be insufﬁ  cient 
to safeguard the individual and the 
public. This would entail that the 
deprivation of liberty was necessary in 
all circumstances [33]. 
Moreover, for detention to comply 
with principles of proportionality and 
freedom from arbitrariness, it must be 
established that the detained person 
is suffering from an infectious disease, 
that the spread of disease is dangerous 
to public safety, and that the detention 
of the infected person is the last resort 
measure in order to prevent disease 
spread. The court ruled that the 
institution of detention for infectious 
disease must be appropriate to the 
nature of the disease. Where these 
conditions are satisﬁ  ed, deprivation 
of liberty is justiﬁ  ed, both on grounds 
of public policy and in order to 
provide medical treatment to the 
affected party. In ruling in favour 
of the applicant the court found 
that the compulsory isolation of the 
applicant by Swedish authorities ought 
to have been considered only as a 
last resort in order to prevent him 
from spreading HIV after less severe 
measures had been considered and 
found to be insufﬁ  cient to safeguard 
the public interest. We believe that 
the forced isolation and conﬁ  nement 
of individuals infected with XDR-
TB and selected MDR-TB may be 
an appropriate and proportionate 
response in deﬁ  ned situations, given 
the extreme risk posed by both strains 
and the fact that less severe measures 
may be insufﬁ  cient to safeguard public 
interest. Patients with XDR-TB should 
also be quarantined separately from 
those with MDR-TB, as the latter is 
potentially curable. 
Although the justness and 
effectiveness of forcibly conﬁ  ning and 
treating patients with TB [34,35] has 
been called into question [36], such an 
approach has met with some degree of 
success in the US [37], where it helped 
bring down TB infection rates in states 
such as New York in the 1990s [38]. We 
would not argue for forcible treatment 
of patients with MDR-TB or XDR-TB, 
simply restriction of mobility rights of 
such individuals. 
Emulation of New York’s 
aforementioned successful approach 
in controlling its TB outbreak could 
empower health ofﬁ  cials in South 
Africa and elsewhere to act decisively 
in tackling emerging XDR-TB and 
MDR-TB outbreaks. The consequences 
of not educating health workers of the 
state’s powers in such instances were 
highlighted on September 12, 2006, in 
Johannesburg, Africa’s commercial and 
air transport hub, when health workers 
allowed a patient diagnosed with XDR-
TB, who refused to be hospitalised, to 
discharge herself. Although this patient 
was eventually traced and forcibly 
hospitalised ﬁ  ve days after her self-
discharge [39], it remains unknown 
how many people she may have 
infected in the months between her 
sputum sample being taken and her 
eventual diagnosis in September 2006, 
and before she was traced after her self-
discharge. 
Questions also remain about how 
authorities should deal with patients 
with MDR-TB whom treatment has 
failed to cure as well as patients with 
XDR-TB in whom cure is unlikely as few 
active drugs remain. While isolating such 
patients until they die—which in the 
case of the slightly less deadly MDR-TB 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040050.g002
South African newspapers fuelled alarm about XDR-TB 
(ﬁ  gure: Anthony Flores)
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could be years—has been described as 
“ethically questionable and impractical” 
[21], this option may, of necessity, need 
to be countenanced. It is not, a priori, 
unethical to restrict the movement of 
those whose infection poses risks to 
public health. It is a matter of what types 
of safeguards are put in place to assure 
the legitimacy of such acts.
There are many such justiﬁ  cations 
emerging in the ﬁ  eld of public health 
ethics that recognise that prevention 
of harm and protection of public 
health are legitimate ethical norms 
[40–42]. Human rights doctrine also 
recognises the limitation of many 
rights in a public health emergency, 
provided the measures employed are 
legitimate, non-arbitrary, publicly 
rendered, and necessary. In this 
regard, section 25 of the Siracusa 
Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights holds: “Public health 
may be invoked as a ground for 
limiting certain rights in order to allow 
a state to take measures dealing with 
a serious threat to the health of the 
population or individual members of 
the population. These measures must 
be speciﬁ  cally aimed at preventing 
disease or injury or providing care for 
the sick and injured” [43]. It must be 
assured that detained individuals have 
appropriate legal council, and given 
the uncertainty of the duration of 
restrictions required, duly constituted 
independent tribunals could be 
established to oversee the process. At 
issue from a human rights perspective 
is whether such prolonged isolation 
represents the least restrictive means 
to achieve this goal and the extent of 
the belief in the severity of the threat. 
We do not intend to resolve this 
issue presently, but believe it is worth 
tabling for broader debate.
The use of legally sanctioned 
restrictive measures for the control of 
XDR-TB should not obscure the fact 
that being infected is not a crime. A 
strong reciprocal obligation is borne 
by authorities so wishing to invoke 
these measures. Those who are isolated 
require humane and decent living 
conditions. In fact the restriction of 
their liberties is more for a collective 
good than for their own. Thus 
every effort must be made to ensure 
conditions of living that preserve 
dignity. Harris and Holm have argued 
that all people with a communicable 
disease have a duty not to infect others. 
They stress, however, that “[i]t is...also 
a duty which we can expect people to 
discharge only if they live in a community 
that does not leave them with all the burdens 
involved in discharging this duty” [38] 
(italics ours). The task of global health 
is to help create these communities.
Conclusion 
XDR-TB is a serious global health 
threat. It has the potential to derail the 
global efforts to contain HIV/AIDS, 
as broadly disseminated XDR-TB will 
prove to be a much more serious public 
health threat owing to its mode of 
transmission. The emergence of XDR-
TB is also an uncomfortable reminder 
of the failure of health systems to 
control problems at a tractable scale. 
If, in the recent past, TB were to have 
been adequately managed when it 
was completely drug sensitive, we 
would not be in such a dire situation 
as is currently the case. This failure 
rests upon us all. We should begin to 
contemplate the response when we 
move to the predictable next phase: 
completely drug-resistant tuberculosis.
By December 1, 2006—World AIDS 
Day—South Africa had reported more 
than 300 cases of XDR-TB [44] (based 
on the latest deﬁ  nition of XDR-TB, 
i.e., resistance to at least rifampicin 
and isoniazid, with resistance to one 
of the injectable drugs [kanamycin, 
amikacin, capreomycin] and one of 
the quinolones). Given the South 
African government’s poor track 
record in dealing with the country’s 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and what is at 
stake if it adopts a similar lethargic 
and denialist response to the country’s 
XDR-TB outbreak, the international 
community must be vigilant in 
monitoring the government’s response 
to this emerging crisis. Although recent 
initiatives of the government [45,46] 
and the Medical Research Council of 
South Africa [28,47] are encouraging, 
these will hopefully not inspire 
complacency amongst ofﬁ  cials. 
While it is encouraging that the 
South African government invited the 
WHO to an October 2006 meeting on 
the emerging crisis [48], it is worth 
noting that neither party raised the 
human rights and ethical dimensions 
of controlling the outbreak. Containing 
XDR-TB and selected MDR-TB will 
require an interdisciplinary approach 
[49] and the synergistic cooperation 
of all organs of the state, including, 
in particular, the judiciary, as well 
as various government departments. 
Moreover, the government should 
urgently consider devising strategies to 
control the disease amongst particularly 
high-risk groups such as prisoners 
and migrant labourers, which might 
necessitate the involvement of prisoner 
advocacy groups and neighbouring 
countries, respectively. 
If WHO is sincere in calling for the 
XDR-TB outbreak in South Africa to be 
treated in the same light as SARS and 
bird ﬂ  u, then global efforts to develop 
rapid diagnostic tests and novel 
treatment regimens must be stepped 
up. In addition to drug development, 
the appropriateness of using these 
technologies in countries with TB/HIV 
epidemics needs to be explored. The 
determination of XDR-TB requires 
specialised laboratories and quality 
assurance, particularly when testing 
for resistance to second-line anti-
tuberculosis agents. Moreover, while 
the diagnosis of MDR-TB may take 
weeks or months, new technologies, 
including liquid culture and PCR 
probes, can reduce this time. Efforts 
must be stepped up to sponsor and 
equip poor countries to address 
these challenges. Depending on 
how successfully the South African 
government controls the outbreak, 
as in the case of SARS, infection 
monitoring at hospitals, border posts, 
and airports may become necessary. 
Given the ethical and legal 
implications of these measures, the 
experience of countries that were 
affected by SARS [50] could prove 
valuable in guiding South Africa to deal 
with its XDR-TB outbreak. Admittedly 
though, more is known of XDR-TB 
than was the case with SARS when it 
ﬁ  rst emerged. In the meantime, South 
Africa must urgently reduce crowding 
in hospitals where patients with TB 
are being treated to reduce the risk 
of the infection spreading, drastically 
expand its surveillance of the disease, 
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and rethink its current counselling, 
treatment, reporting, and tracing 
strategies. It must also devise measures 
to reduce contact between patients with 
TB and those suspected or conﬁ  rmed 
with MDR-TB and XDR-TB in the 
weeks or months it takes to diagnose 
the latter two infections. It must also 
devise appropriate infection-prevention 
strategies for health workers treating 
such patients. 
All reasonable attempts must be 
made to accommodate the interests 
of infected patients in a sensitive 
and humane manner, although, 
if necessary, the government must 
adopt a more robust approach 
towards uncooperative patients with 
MDR-TB and XDR-TB, which might 
necessitate favouring the interests 
of the wider public over that of the 
patient. Although such an approach 
might interfere with the patient’s right 
to autonomy and will undoubtedly 
have human rights implications, 
such measures are reasonable and 
justiﬁ  able, and must be seen in a 
utilitarian perspective. Ultimately in 
such crises, the interests of public 
health must prevail over the rights of 
the individual.   
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